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DISCRIMINATION 
Righting Past Wrongs: 
When Affirmative Action May Be Reverse Discrimination 




Jackson Board of Education 
(Docket No. 84-1340) 
ArguedNovember6, 1985 
Wygant v.jackson Board of Educatiou may well prove to 
be one of this term's most controversial Supreme Court 
decisions. In it, the Justices will confront the vexing issue 
of whether-absent a finding of intentional discrimina-
tion-a government entity may voluntarily bestow spe· 
cial perferences to minority group members. 
Specifically, Wygant concerns the constitutionality of the 
Jackson Board of Education's practice of laying off se-
nior white employees ahead of black employees to en-
sure that there is no decrease in the percentage of 
minority teachers. 
FACTS 
In a 1973 collective bargaining agreement entered 
between the Jackson Board of Education and the Jack-
son Education Association, an exception was created to a 
last-hired first-fired layoff provision. Under this excep· 
tion, non-minority teachers would be laid off out-of-
turn when necessary to preserve the existing percentage 
of minority teachers. When the school board laid off 
senior white employees in April 1981, Wendy Wygant 
and other affected non-minority teachers filed this law-
suit. 
The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, in September of 1982, upheld the 
layoff provision (546 F.Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982)). 
In October, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals 
affirmed this decision (746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
The Sixth Circuit flatly rejected Wygant's argument 
that, before preferential treatment can be accorded to 
minorities, there must be a judicial determination of 
past unlawful discrimination. Instead, the court main-
tained that a public sector employer may adopt "an 
affirmative action plan to eliminate conspicuous racial 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." By 
Neal Devins is an altomey speciali%ing in civil rights law, 
1121 Vennont Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20425; tele-
phone (202) 376-8372. 
Issue No.4 
comparing the percentage of minority teachers to the 
percentage of minority students, the appellate court 
determined that minority teachers were substantially 
underrepresented. 
The appellate court then ruled that the Jackson pro-
gram would be upheld if it passed a "reasonableness" 
test. The reasonableness test asks whether the affirma-
tive action plan is "substantially related to the objectives 
of remedying past discrimination and correcting 
substantial and chronic underrepresentation." The ap· 
pellate court concluded that the school board's layoff 
policy satisfied this requirement; for it addressed his-
toric discrimination, promoted racial harmony and pro-
vided role models for minority students. 
On appeal, Wygant argues against both the "reason-
ableness" standard and the lower court's determination 
of minority underrepresentation. For Wygant and the 
other teachers, race-based practices can be justified only 
if they respond directly to appropriate findings of dis-
crimination. Specifically, they claim that, rather than a 
"reasonableness" standard, the school board should be 
forced to demonstrate that its layoff procedure is the 
least restrictive means available to satisfy the state's com-
pelling interest in eradicating identified discrimination. 
Related to this, Wygant argues that mere differences 
between the percentages of minority students and teach-
ers does not support remedial school board action. Mo-
reover, she claims that-in the absence of a 
constitutional violation of student rights that requires 
such a remedy-minority teacher underrepresentation 
should be judged by comparisons of the percentage of 
minority teachers to the relevant labor market. Under 
this formulation, Wygant asserts that the layoff plan 
cannot pass muster under either a compelling interest 
test or a reasonableness test, for there is no minority 
teacher underrepresentation in Jackson schools. 
The Jackson Board of Education, for the most part, 
supports the lower court's analysis. The board, however, 
also asserts that the layoff policy responded to specific 
segregative school board policies, not societal discrimi-
nation. Through this factual assertion (apparently made 
for the first time in its Supreme Court brief), the board 
claims that the layoff policy would satisfy the compelling 
interest standard advanced by Wygant. 
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Wygant will prove significant both as a legal prece-
dent and as a matter of social policy. As a precedent, this 
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decision will fill an important hole in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the so-called "reverse discrimination" 
issue. Prior to this case, the Court has been mute on the 
manner in which municipal and state governments may 
address past societal discrimination. In the Bakke case 
(438 U.S. 265 (1978)), the Court-in invalidating a state 
medical school's preferential admissions policy-sug-
gested that race may be a factor, but not a determinative 
factor, in certain types of government decisionmaking. 
In Fullilove v. Klutwick (448 U.S. 448 (1980)), the Court 
ruled that Congress, through a minority business set-
aside provision in a Public Works Act, may seek to rem-
edy the effects of past racial discrimination. 
The precedential value of Bakke and Fu/lilovr is sub-
ject to debate, however. In both cases, no single opinion 
concerning the constitutionality of "reverse discrimina-
tion" commanded a majority of the Justices' votes. Con-
sequently, Wygant, aside from covering another 
dimension of the "reverse discrimination" controversy, 
may also prove to be the Court's first full opinion on this 
issue. (The Court, however, has spoken with some clar-
ity on the legality of reverse discrimination under the 
employment section (Title VI I) of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. In United Stales Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 
U.S. 193 (1979), the Court ruled that Title VII does not 
prohibit a private employer from voluntarily engaging in 
certain kinds of affirmative action. And, in Firefighters v. 
Stalls, 104 S.Ct. 2576 (1984), Preview 1983-84 term, pp. 
229-30, the Court invalidated a lower court order that 
disrupted seniority-based layoffs to ensure adequate mi-
nority representation in the workforce.) 
In many respects, Wygant holds the key to future 
state and local efforts to address racial disparities 
through numerically-based affirmative action. If the Su-
preme Court views the Jackson program-in which se-
nior white employees were laid off solely because of 
their race-as a permissible attempt by a municipality to 
address past societal discrimination, the court would 
effectively place a seal of approval on affirmative action. 
If, however, the Court holds that government-spon-
sored race-based classifications must narrowly respond 
to identifiable purposeful discrimination, race conscious 
action would be limited to those instances where the 
government-through judicial action-could be com-
pelled to adopt such a race-based classification. 
Although it seems almost certain that Wygant will 
speak broadly about the scope of permissible affirmative 
action, there are two ways in which the Court can limit 
its holding. First, if the school board's layoff policy is 
viewed as a narrowly-focused response to past illegal 
discrimination, Wygant will be limited to the issue of 
whether a school board can voluntarily remedy a situa-
tion that it otherwise could be forced to remedy in the 
context of a school desegregation lawsuit. Second, the 
Court could adhere to the school board's education pol-
icy argument; namely, that deference should be 
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accorded the Jackson School Board in its efforts to pro-
mote racial understanding. 
ARGUMENTS 
For the jackson Board of Education (Counsel of Record, jerome 
A. Suskind, 2300 Spring Arbor Road, jackson, Ml 49203,· tele-
plwne (517) 787-5340) 
I. A local school board has authority to evaluate the 
effects of its past conduct and, in this case, the layoff 
provision was an appropriate response to prior dis-
crimination. 
2. Regardless of prior discrimination, a local school 
board can seek to advance educational and social 
objectives through a race-conscious layoff plan. 
3. The Jackson layoff plan, by distributing layoff bur-
dens equitably, does not disrupt the legitimate expec-
tations of third parties. 
For Wendy Wygant (Counsel of Record, K. Presto11 Gade,jr., 
1717 Washington Avenue, Golden, CO 80401: telephone 
(JOJ) 278-JJOO) 
1. Race-based layoffs, to be justified, must be the least 
restrictive means available to serve some compelling 
state interest. Since the school board action did not 
violate the Constitution, there is no state interest suf-
ficiently compelling to justify the layoff provision. 
2. Differences between the respective percentages of 
minority teachers and minority students do not sup-
port a finding of actionable discrimination. More-
over, the use of proportional representation goals to 
eradicate such disparities does not constitute a com-
pelling educational objective. 
3. The layoff plan singles out a few non-minority teach-
ers to bear the burden for district goals of racial 
equality. 
AMICUS BRIEFS 
In Support of the Jackson Board of Education 
The city of Detroit; Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law; Mexican American Legal Defense 
and Educational Funds; the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund; the NAACP; the National School 
Boards Association; the National Lawyers Guild; the 
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund; the Women's 
Legal Defense Fund; the National Education Associa-
tion; the Jackson Education Association; the Michigan 
Department of Civil Rights; and the states of Minnesota, 
California, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Mexico and Wis-
consin. 
In Support of Wendy Wygant 
The American Federation of Teachers, the United 
States, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Mid-America 
Legal Foundation and the Anti-Defamation League of 
B'nai B'rith. 
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